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No. 20180055-CA
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
__________________
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee
v.
JOSEPH CRESCENCIO GRANADOS,
Defendant/Appellant.
__________________
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT

INTRODUCTION
Pursuant to Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 24(b), this reply brief is
“limited to responding to the facts and arguments raised in the appellee’s . . .
principal brief.” The brief does not restate arguments from the opening brief or
address matters that do not merit reply.
RESPONSE TO THE STATE’S STATEMENT OF FACTS
The State writes that Granados “stole his girlfriend’s red Chevy Malibu.”
State’s Brief (SB) 2 (citing R:627-29), 4, 17, 20, 23. At the record pages the State
cites, a property crimes detective testified that he had communication with a
woman associated with Granados; the prosecutor then stopped the detective — “I
don’t want you to tell us what [the woman] told you. I just want you to tell us
what you did as a result of that conversation.” R:627. The detective said that he
“was looking for her vehicle, which was a red 2002 Chevy Malibu” and that he
1

was looking for the woman’s “ex, Joseph Granados.” R:627. In closing
argument, the prosecution told the jury, “you didn’t hear the words ‘stolen car.’
[The owner] wanted her car back, but [the property crimes detective] wasn’t
trying to get back a stolen car.” R:1135-36.
Regardless, the property crimes detective’s testimony that Granados fled
the night before the shooting, and that the police were interested in detaining
Granados for reasons related to the car he was driving, offer an alternate
explanation for his flight from police in the hours after the shooting.
The State writes that the witnesses “all agreed that the person they saw
matched Defendant’s description — a heavily tattooed Hispanic male with very
short hair, a mustache and the word ‘eighteen’ tattooed on his upper lip.” SB 21
(citing R:572-73, 604, 640, 703). It is worth noting that no witness described the
distinctive aspect of that description – the “eighteen” tattoo. SM testified that the
driver had arm tattoos and was Hispanic. R:572-73. The eyewitness who was
provided a photo array and did not select Granados said the shooter “had a round
face and he had really dark eyes and he had really dark hair. And it was short all
the way but, you know, not — just short, really dark hair” and “a mustache.”
R:604. Another eyewitness testified that she saw the shooter pull a gun and then
she “put [her] daughter’s head down” and put her own “head down from there.”
R:640.
The State writes that “[t]he entire incident — from [SM’s] 911 call until
Defendant’s arrest — lasted approximately two hours.” SB 9 (citing R:668). On
2

the record page the State cites, the testimony is that “from the time of the
incident 4:13, Mr. Granados is taken into custody at 6:55.” R:668. In any event,
there was a significant time gap between the incident and the arrest.
The State writes that Granados’s “DNA was found on at least one of the
casings.” SB 23 (citing R:965, 975, State’s Exhibit 51-52). In its Statement of
Facts, the State acknowledges that the casings were tested with the live rounds of
ammunition. SB 10-11. The technician testified that she “processed the casings
and the unspent rounds in the same solution” and there was “no way to
determine which item or how many of those items that DNA came from.” R:919.
The unspent rounds included a 34-caliber bullet, a different caliber from the gun
used in the shooting. R:836. As the State put it in closing, “they recover 10 spent
shell casings, two live rounds of ammunition. One of those is insignificant in
light of the fact it’s a different caliber from the rest, but the ten casings and the
one live round, are all 40 caliber which is consistent with what the West Jordan
crime tech testified were these ballistic findings with respect to the — the bullets
that they were able to recover from the scene.” R:1110. As argued in the opening
brief, the testimony that firing a bullet may destroy DNA made it more likely that
the recovered DNA came from the unspent round. Opening Brief (OB) 14-15.
The State writes that the Opening Brief “does not cite to any record
evidence for [the] proposition” that Granados’s “DNA could end up on the spent
casings simply because he was in the car.” SB 24 (citing OB 15). The Opening
Brief provided record citations to pages 967, 987, 786, 899-900, 912-915, and
3

970 for that argument. OB 15. The DNA analyst testified that she had no way to
tell “whether [the DNA in the filter] came from transfer of DNA or . . . if it was
directly deposited.” R:967. The police officers testified that Granados was sweaty
and that the chase would have shifted around the items in his car. R:987, 786.
The crime scene technician testified that DNA can come from sweat, saliva, and
skin cells. R:899-900. DNA can be transferred by sneezing or touching and
crime scene technicians must take precautions to avoid transferring DNA.
R:900. The DNA analyst and crime scene technician both testified that finding
DNA on a spent shell casing was rare. R:914, 970. The technician explained that
heat damages DNA. R:915. This was evidence that Granados’s DNA could end
up on the spent shell casings — or the unspent rounds — simply because he was
in the car during a high speed chase. R:967, 987, 786, 899-900, 912-915, 970.
ARGUMENT
I.

This Court should apply the standard prejudice test for
violations of the rules of criminal procedure.
The State argues that State v. Knight, 734 P.2d 913 (Utah 1987), a case

addressing the standard of prejudice for a violation of the Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure is “wholly inapplicable,” SB 28, to the determination of what standard
of prejudice governs the violation of Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 17(g)
alleged in the Opening Brief. OB 16-17. Counsel is unaware of a controlling case
where a judge replaced a juror with an alternate without questioning the juror
and over the defense’s objection. And the State cites no case addressing this
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issue. SB 28-29 (citing Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81 (1988), Taylor v.
Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975), United States v. Taylor, 663 F. Supp. 2d 1157
(D.N.M. 2009), State v. Menzies, 889 P.2d 393 (Utah 1994)). But precedent
suggests that the Knight standard — a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable
result — should apply to a violation of Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 17(g).
The State relies on Taylor v. Louisiana, which held that a jury venire must
not “systematically exclude distinctive groups in the community and thereby fail
to be reasonably representative thereof” and did not address replacing a
competent juror with the alternate over the defense’s objection. 419 U.S. at 538.
United State v. Taylor also addressed an alleged “violation of the fair crosssection requirement.” 663 F. Supp. 2d at 1162-63.
Ross v. Oklahoma addressed the loss of a peremptory challenge, and
rejected “the notion that the loss of a peremptory challenge constitutes a violation
of the constitutional right to an impartial jury.” 487 U.S. at 88. “So long as the
jury that sits is impartial, the fact that the defendant had to use a peremptory
challenge to achieve that result does not mean the Sixth Amendment was
violated.” Id. If, however, a ruling “result[ed] in the seating of any juror who
should have been dismissed for cause[,] . . . that circumstance would require
reversal.” United States v. Martinez-Salazar, 528 U.S. 304, 316 (2000).
As argued in the Opening Brief, State v. Menzies, 889 P.2d 393 (Utah
1994), also addressed a lost peremptory challenge, not the replacement of a juror
after the presentation of evidence had begun. OB 22-23. And it is notable that
5

Menzies overruled Crawford v. Manning, 542 P.2d 1091, 1093 (Utah 1975),
which was so concerned with the strategic selection of the jury that it held
prejudice should be presumed when one side is deprived of a peremptory
challenge.
In addressing the standard of prejudice for mid-trial juror replacement,
this Court should keep in mind that requiring the defendant to demonstrate that
the alternate juror should have been struck for cause before the trial began would
sanction the replacement of sitting jurors over the defense’s objection and open
the door to abuse. OB 20-24 (citing Bruckshaw v. Frankford Hosp. of City of
Philadelphia, 58 A.3d 102, 153 (Pa. 2012)).
A ruling that “result[s] in the seating of any juror who should have been
dismissed for cause” will “require reversal” under the U.S. Constitution.
Martinez-Salazar, 528 U.S. at 316. But replacing a strategically selected juror
with an alternate over the defense’s objection is troubling in a different way.
“[T]he process of jury selection is a highly subjective, judgmental, and intuitive
process” and trial attorneys make “conscious and strategic choice[s].” State v.
Litherland, 2000 UT 76, ¶ 20. “A prospective juror’s demeanor, interaction with
others in the courtroom, and personality in general may all play an important
role in providing clues as to that juror’s likely predilections toward the case at
hand.” Id. ¶ 21. “Defense counsel acting on their own intuitions, or upon their
clients’ requests, clearly have the right to identify and prefer particular jurors.”
Id. ¶ 23. And counsel has “little reason to save . . . peremptory challenges for the
6

last alternate chosen because there is only a small chance of the last alternate
juror deliberating with the jury.” Bruckshaw, 58 A.3d at 113.
“[P]arties view their peremptory challenges as a tactical tool” and use them
on jurors they “suspect[] of harboring hidden biases.” Turner v. Univ. of Utah
Hosps. & Clinics, 2013 UT 52, ¶ 27. “[T]here are cases where attorneys have good
reason to suspect bias, but lack sufficient grounds to challenge those jurors for
cause.” Id. ¶ 30. In fact, counsel may suspect that a juror counsel “suspected of
bias (but lacked grounds to challenge for cause)” “posed the greatest threat to a
verdict in her favor.” Id.
Moreover, when “counsel was able to observe jurors, including the
alternate, over the course of” the actual presentation of evidence, “[e]verything
from the jurors’ demeanors to their reactions to testimony may have played a role
in counsel’s decision not to insist on replacing the sleepy juror.” State v.
Marquina, 2018 UT App 219, ¶ 39, cert. granted Supreme Court Case No.
20180994-SC (Attached as Addendum A). This Court should not import the
requirement for a constitutional violation — showing that a biased or
incompetent juror sat on the case — to a claim that the court violated the rules of
criminal procedure by replacing a competent, strategically selected juror with an
alternate over the defense’s objection.
State v. Knight addressed the standard of prejudice for a violation of the
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. The defendant in Knight had “filed a written
motion requesting that the trial court order the prosecution to disclose certain
7

specified items and information, including the addresses and telephone numbers
of the State’s potential witnesses and any statements taken from them”
“[p]ursuant to Rule 16(a)(5) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure.” 734 P.2d
at 915. The Utah Supreme Court held that the “prosecutor’s obligation to comply
with [the] request for discovery must be evaluated under Rule 16 of the Utah
Rules of Criminal Procedure,” which mandates disclosure of “‘evidence which the
court determines on good cause shown should be made available to the defendant
in order for the defendant to adequately prepare his defense.’” Knight, 734 P.2d
at 916 (quoting Utah R. Crim. P. 16(a)(5)). After determining the State had
violated its disclosure duties and “the trial court denied all requested relief,” the
Utah Supreme Court explained that the next question was “whether the
prosecutor’s failure to produce the requested information resulted in prejudice
sufficient to warrant reversal under Rule 30” — it described that standard as the
determination of whether, “without the error there was a reasonable likelihood of
a more favorable result for the defendant.” Id. at 919 (internal quotation marks
omitted) (italics omitted).
After Knight issued, the Utah Supreme Court cited it for the proposition
that “[b]ecause the error was in violation of a rule of criminal procedure, its
harmfulness is analyzed under the standard provided by Utah Rule of Criminal
Procedure 30.” State v. Bell, 770 P.2d 100, 105 (Utah 1988).
In Granados’s case, he challenged the replacement of a juror the defense
had strategically selected and observed during the presentation of evidence. Utah
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Rule of Criminal Procedure 17(g) explains that a “case shall proceed using the
alternate juror” when “a juror becomes ill, disabled or disqualified.” A claim that
the court violated this rule because the juror the court dismissed was not ill,
disabled or disqualified, is different from a claim that a biased or incompetent
juror sat in violation of the U.S. Constitution. As argued in the Opening Brief,
this Court should analyze the rule violation’s harmfulness under the standard
provided in Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 30 — the reasonable likelihood of a
more favorable result standard. Knight, 734 P.2d at 913; Bell, 770 P.2d at 100;
OB 20-25. And for the reasons articulated in the Opening Brief, this Court
should reverse under that standard. OB 20-25.
II.

The court abused its discretion when it dismissed a juror over
the defense’s objection and without first questioning the
juror.
The State relies on State v. Marquina, 2018 UT App 219, to argue that the

principle predominating cases involving sleeping jurors is discretion. SB 31-35.
Marquina issued after the Opening Brief, and the Utah Supreme Court has
granted certiorari to review it in an order dated March 18, 2019. Addendum A.
Marquina includes analysis that is helpful to Granados’s case. It explains
that the court’s response “depends on the facts of the case, including how the
issue was brought to the court’s attention.” 2018 UT App 219, ¶ 31. Marquina
involved an unpreserved claim of constitutional error where the “prosecutors
mentioned a sleepy juror” but defense counsel “had not noticed any of the jurors
sleeping” and did not object to allowing the juror to remain on the panel. Id. ¶¶
9

14-15 (alteration omitted). The claim on appeal was that the defendant’s “Sixth
Amendment right to an impartial jury was violated because at least one juror
reportedly slept during his trial.” Id. ¶ 17. As explained above, Granados’s case is
different. “[T]he issue was brought to the court’s attention” by defense counsel,
who explained that the seated juror was strategically selected and that the
defense had not observed her sleeping. R:743-45; 789 (the defense had seen the
juror taking notes and paying attention); 791. Additionally, the prosecutor
agreed it would be appropriate to question the juror before dismissing her.
R:789; 791-92. Therefore, where Marquina involved an unpreserved
constitutional claim, Granados’s case involves a preserved claim that the trial
court dismissed a competent, strategically selected juror and replaced her with
the alternate.
Additionally, Marquina explained that “Utah law does not require a court
to conduct sua sponte a voir dire after a report of a sleepy juror.” 2018 UT App
219, ¶ 34. That does not mean that the court can dismiss a juror over objection
without first questioning the juror. To the contrary, it suggests that, as argued in
the district court and the Opening Brief, the observation that a juror appears to
have fallen asleep for portions of the trial does not necessarily require the strong
medicine of dismissing that juror. R:743 (defense counsel saying he was also
getting tired of video of the car chase); 745 (defense counsel explaining that he
had seen jurors nod off in many trials and arguing the juror was not observed
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sleeping during the presentation of critical evidence); OB 16-20 (arguing that
falling asleep is not necessarily disqualifying for a juror).
As argued in the Opening Brief, the district court erred when it dismissed a

juror suspected of sleeping without first questioning her. OB 16- 20.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons above and in the opening brief, Granados respectfully
requests that this Court reverse.
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SUBMITIED this ~/- - - day of April
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NATHALIE s. SKIBINE
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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ADDENDUM A

The Order of the Court is stated below:
Dated: March 18, 2019
/s/ Thomas R. Lee
08:52:18 AM
Associate Chief Justice

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
---oo0oo---

ORDER
Supreme Court Case No. 20180994-SC
State of Utah,
Respondent,
v.
Raymond Jesus Marquina,
Petitioner.

Court of Appeals Case No. 20150854CA
Trial Court Case No. 141914264

This matter is before the court upon a Petition for Writ of Certiorari, filed on December
7, 2018.
The Petition for Writ of Certiorari is granted as to the following issues:
1. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in concluding Petitioner had failed to
demonstrate that the district court plainly erred in declining to inquire into the
attentiveness of a juror.
2. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in concluding Petitioner had failed to
demonstrate his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance in responding to
observations that a juror may have been sleeping.
A briefing schedule will be established hereafter. The parties shall comply with the
briefing schedule upon its issuance. Requests for extension are disfavored, but may be
granted with good cause.
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